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Steckman and Turner: Rule 12 Dismissal Motion

DETERMINING WHEN EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE NOT
ATTACHED TO OR INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE IN A
PLEADING MAY BE CONSIDERED ON A RULE 12
DISMISSAL MOTION
Laurence A. Steckman*
Rita D. Turner**

I.

INTRODUCTION

When courts choose to consider evidence outside the pleadings on Rule 12 dismissal applications, the applications are generally
converted to motions for summary judgment.1 However, if the court
deems the extrinsic evidence to be part of the pleading, such evidence
may be considered without conversion.2 Extrinsic evidence may be
considered part of a complaint when it is (1) attached to the pleading,
(2) incorporated by reference in the pleading, or (3) the court deems
the evidence integral to at least one claim in the pleading.3 Under the
*
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law for more than twenty-five years. He is the author or lead co-author of more than forty
published works on the law.
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Law Student’s Association, Women’s Law Forum and International Law Society.
1
DeLuca v. AccessIT Grp., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 54, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
2
Id. (citing Madu, Edozie & Madu, P.C. v. SocketWorks Ltd. Nigeria, 265 F.R.D. 106,
122–23 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
3
See Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital, Inc., No. 11

115

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 1 [2014], Art. 10

116

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 31

third prong, evidence is “integral” to the pleading when plaintiff has
actual notice of the evidence and the complaint “relies heavily upon
its terms and effect” in “framing” the pleading.4 Courts, however,
have not provided clear guidance as to how courts should determine
when a plaintiff has “relied” on extrinsic evidence in “framing”
pleading content, an issue that may be particularly complicated where
plaintiff cites neither the document at issue nor its content.
This article argues that a “but for” analysis should be used to
determine whether a pleading has relied on extrinsic evidence. Part I
reviews Second Circuit cases that analyze whether external evidence
is “integral” to the complaint. Part II discusses analyses courts have
employed in assessing whether plaintiff has “relied” on extrinsic evidence in “framing” the pleading. Part III argues that courts should
apply a “but for” test of reliance to determine whether extrinsic evidence has been used to frame a pleading regardless of whether the
document or its content is included in the complaint. Restated, if
“but for” plaintiff’s knowledge of the extrinsic evidence at issue, the
pleading would have been materially different from that which plaintiff filed, then the evidence will be “integral” to the complaint, for
motion purposes, and sufficient “reliance” will be deemed present to
allow the court to consider the evidence on a dismissal motion, withCiv. 0505, 2011 WL 2610661, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2011):
In deciding a motion to dismiss, this Court may consider the full text of
documents that are quoted in or attached to the complaint, or documents
that the plaintiff either possessed or knew about and relied upon in bringing the suit. “Plaintiffs’ failure to include matters of which as pleaders
they had notice and which were integral to their claim—and that they
apparently most wanted to avoid—may not serve as a means of forestalling the district court's decision on the motion.”
Id. (quoting Cortec Industries, Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 1991)).
See also I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs. P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir.
1991) (“[P]laintiff cannot evade a properly argued motion to dismiss simply because plaintiff
has chosen not to attach the [document] to the complaint or to incorporate it by reference.”).
See also L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir. 2011):
On a 12(c) motion, the court considers the complaint, the answer, any
written documents attached to them, and any matter of which the court
can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case. A complaint is [also] deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as
an exhibit, materials incorporated in it by reference, and documents that,
although not incorporated by reference, are integral to the complaint.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
4
Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Int’l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam)).
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out summary judgment conversion.
II.

LEADING CASES CONSIDERING WHETHER EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ON RULE 12 DISMISSAL
MOTIONS

Cortec Industries, Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P.,5 a heavily cited
authority on the issues under discussion, held that if plaintiffs had notice of extrinsic evidence and the evidence was “integral” to the complaint, the reviewing court could consider it on a motion to dismiss.6
Cortec was a securities fraud case involving the purchase of a company.7 Plaintiffs were buyers that “allege[d] they would not have entered” the transaction but for defendant’s fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations and omissions regarding the company’s financial
condition.8 Defendants moved to dismiss, submitting a stock purchase agreement and offering memorandum which contained representations regarding the company’s financial condition.9 Plaintiffs
objected that the court should not consider the documents because
proper inquiry was limited to examination of the four corners of the
complaint. Defendants’ submissions were neither attached to nor explicitly referenced in the pleading.10 The Second Circuit disagreed.
Plaintiffs’ failure to include documents of which they “had notice,”
and were “integral” to their claim, which they “apparently most
wanted to avoid”11 could not forestall dismissal:
[W]hen a plaintiff chooses not to attach to the complaint or incorporate by reference a prospectus upon
which it solely relies and which is integral to the complaint, the defendant may produce the prospectus
when attacking the complaint for its failure to state a
claim, because plaintiff should not so easily be allowed to escape the consequences of its own failure. . .
. Where plaintiff has actual notice of all the infor5
6
7
8
9
10
11

949 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 46.
Cortec, 949 F.2d at 46-48.
Id. at 44; see generally L-7 Designs, Inc., 647 F.3d at 422.
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mation in the movant’s papers and has relied upon
these documents in framing the complaint the necessity of translating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one under
Rule 56 is largely dissipated.12
The court continued:
Despite the fact that the documents attached to defendant Westinghouse’s motion to dismiss were neither public disclosure documents required by law to be
filed with the SEC, nor documents actually filed with
the SEC, nor attached as exhibits to the complaint or
incorporated by reference in it, the district court was
entitled to consider them in deciding the motion to
dismiss. . . . It did not lack notice of those documents;
these papers were integral to its complaint. . . . [T]he
district court . . . could have viewed them on the motion to dismiss because there was undisputed notice to
plaintiffs of their contents and they were integral to
plaintiffs’ claim.13
In that same year, the Second Circuit held in I. Meyer Pincus
& Assocs., P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co.,14 another heavily cited case
on the present issues, that plaintiff cannot “evade a properly argued
motion to dismiss simply because plaintiff has chosen not to attach
the [document] to the complaint or to incorporate it by reference.”15
In Brass v. Amer. Film Techs, Inc.,16 the Second Circuit stated that,
on a motion to dismiss, a court may consider documents “either in
plaintiffs’ possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied
on in bringing suit.”17 Brass was subsequently abrogated by Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc.,18 which held that mere “notice or possession” was not enough and that reliance was “a necessary prerequisite
12

Cortec, 949 F.2d at 47-48 (emphasis added). Although the court stated that the plaintiffs “solely” relied on the documents, it does not provide any reason why reliance on additional materials should preclude a finding that a document is “integral.”
13
Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
14
936 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991).
15
Id. at 762; accord In re J.P. Jeanneret Associates, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 340, 354-55
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
16
987 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1993).
17
Id. at 150.
18
282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002).
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to the court’s consideration of [such] document on a dismissal motion.”19
In International Audiotext Network, Inc. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co.,20 the Second Circuit held that if a plaintiff
“relies heavily upon [a document’s] terms and effect . . . [the document] is ‘integral’ to the complaint.”21 International Audiotext involved a telecommunications information provider that sued a longdistance carrier, AT&T, alleging Sherman Act violations.22 The
claims arose from the carrier’s refusal to contract with it regarding
international calls.23 Plaintiff wanted to enter the international market for “audiotext” services, but claimed AT&T had monopoly power
and would not deal with plaintiff because it had contracted with a different carrier.24 Plaintiff’s proposal was similar to that of the party
with whom AT&T had contracted, and it claimed AT&T’s refusal to
work with plaintiff was an antitrust violation.25 Although the complaint did not incorporate the competitor agreement, the pleading relied heavily on its “terms and effect”—therefore, the court held the
agreement was “integral” to the complaint and, for that reason, it
could properly “consider its terms in deciding whether . . . [plaintiff]
can prove any set of facts that would entitle it to relief.”26
In 2002, in Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., the Second Circuit restricted the liberal approach some courts had taken as to
whether extrinsic evidence should be deemed “integral” to a pleading.27 The court began by emphasizing, as prior courts had held, that
“[e]ven where a document is not incorporated by reference, the court
may nevertheless consider it where the complaint ‘relies heavily upon
its terms and effect,’ which renders the document ‘integral’ to the
complaint.”28 However, the court emphasized that mere notice or
possession of a document, as suggested in Brass, would not be
enough to allow such consideration of a document, absent summary
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Id. at 153.
62 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 72.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 71.
Id.
Int’l Audiotext Network, Inc., 62 F.3d at 71.
Id. at 72.
Chambers, 282 F.3d at 152-54.
Id. at 153 (quoting Int’l Audiotext Network, Inc., 62 F.3d at 72 (per curiam)).
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judgment conversion.29 Determining whether certain Codes could be
considered on the motion to dismiss, the court held that because the
pleading did not refer to the Codes and because it was unclear that
the Codes’ text was incorporated into the contracts at issue, the Codes
could not be considered part of the complaint, even if plaintiff knew
of them.30 The defense had not convinced the court that plaintiff relied on the Codes in “framing” the pleading, which was an element
the defense had to show before the court would consider the Codes.31
In Berman v. Sugo LLC,32 counter-plaintiffs relied on a letter
of understanding in arguing the parties intended to be bound by an
oral operating agreement which stated that it (the agreement) would
serve as a precursor to a more formal operating agreement between
members.33 The court noted that because the counter-plaintiffs were
relying, in part, on the “terms and effect” of the letter of understanding to set forth their claims, this satisfied the prerequisites for the
court’s consideration of the letter under Chambers.34 Such consideration, the court explained, presented no danger of prejudice to the
counter—plaintiffs because one had “actual notice” of the document.
Specifically, he not only signed and executed it, but attached it as an
exhibit to his affidavit and had relied on it in a different action, establishing, to the court’s satisfaction, the “fairness of its consideration”
on the instant motion to dismiss.35 Consideration of a document on a
motion to dismiss cannot be avoided where the pleader has notice of
29

Id. at 153; see, e.g., In re Lyondell Chemical Co., 491 B.R. 41, 50 n.48 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing development of this body of law and noting the argument that
Chambers had limited the rulings in the 1990s cases (and referring to them as “arguably
clashing rulings”)). Chambers clearly rejected the idea that mere possession of a document
should be sufficient to allow consideration. Chambers, 282 F.3d at 153. The Lyondell court,
however, rejected the proposition that Chambers overruled the 1990s cases and reiterated
that courts need not disregard documents that a plaintiff knows about but intentionally disregards, where they are “integral” to plaintiff’s claims, forcing the defense to incur the burden
and additional expense of preparing for a summary judgment motion. Lyondell Chemical
Co., 491 B.R. at 50.
30
Chambers, 282 F.3d at 154.
31
Id. (The parties also disagreed as to whether and how the Codes related to or affected
the contractual relationships at issue—they could have been irrelevant or they could have
been intended to modify the recording contracts at issue.).
32
580 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
33
Id. at 201.
34
Id. (quoting Chambers, 282 F.3d at 153, “a plaintiff's reliance on the terms and effect of
a document in drafting the complaint is a necessary prerequisite to the court's consideration
of the document on a dismissal motion; mere notice or possession is not enough”).
35
Id.
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a document integral to its claims.36
Summarizing, if a defendant can show plaintiff knew of the
document’s existence at the time the pleading was drafted (and thus
would not be prejudiced if it were considered on motion) and that
plaintiff relied on the document (or its “terms and effect”) in framing
complaint allegations, thus rendering the document (and/or its content) integral to plaintiff’s claim, such a document may be properly
considered on a dismissal motion without the necessity of summary
judgment conversion.37 However, the courts provide little guidance
as to how the highlighted terms should be analyzed, even in difficult
cases where such analysis should be expected.38
III.

CASES CONSTRUING THE CONCEPT OF “RELIANCE” IN THE
CONTEXT OF MOTIONS TO DISMISS BASED ON UNCITED
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE

Although many cases hold that where it is “evident” that
plaintiff relied on a document in framing a complaint, it may be considered on a dismissal motion, courts rarely explain exactly what it is

36

Id.
But see Anglo-German Progressive Fund, Ltd., v. Concorde Group, Inc., No. 09 Civ.
8708, 2010 WL 3911490, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2010) (explaining that the rule is subject
to three exceptions. First, the court may consider such a document if it is incorporated by
reference. Second, it may consider an extrinsic document if it is “integral” to the complaint,
i.e., the complaint “relies heavily upon its terms and effect.” Third it may consider an extrinsic document if plaintiff knew of or possessed the document “and relied upon [it] in
framing the complaint.”). In Anglo-German, plaintiff had possession of a private placement
memorandum and knew its contents when it filed its amended pleading. Id. at *4. The
memorandum could be considered, the court held, under Cortec, but it did not explain exactly how plaintiff “relied” on the document to “frame” the complaint. Id. at *3-4.
38
See generally Bath Petroleum Storage, Inc. v. Market Hub Partners, L.P., 129 F. Supp.
2d 578, 581 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the defendant could rely on certain correspondence between plaintiffs, defendant and government agencies, which plaintiff failed to attach
to its complaint). Plaintiff, the court observed, was on notice of the documents’ content and,
moreover, had relied on that correspondence in bringing suit. Id. at 581. Citing Cortec, the
Bath court stated “plaintiff should not so easily [by failing to attach documents] be allowed
to escape the consequences of his own failure . . . plaintiff should not be permitted to survive
a motion to dismiss and put a defendant to the trouble and expense of discovery simply by
excluding highly relevant facts and documents . . . .” Id. The decision did not explain exactly how plaintiff “relied” on these documents to “frame” its pleading nor whether any of the
correspondence that defendants submitted was actually referenced in the complaint. Id. It
did say, however, that defendants should not be put to the “trouble and expense” of litigation
by the exclusion of documents or information that was “highly relevant.” Id.
37
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that makes “reliance” evident.39 The cases contain little discussion of
how concepts such as “reliance,” “dependency” and “framing”
should be understood when a pleader does not reference a document.
Nevertheless, a few cases in which plaintiff omits reference to the evidence for tactical or strategic reasons do provide some guidance as
to how to determine if plaintiff “relied” on such evidence.
In DeLuca v. AccessIT Group, Inc.,40 for example, the court,
referring to “extraneous information” and conjoining insights from
Cortec, International Audiotext, and Chambers, explained what
should be necessary for such information to be counted as “integral”
to a complaint:
To be integral to a complaint, the plaintiff must have
(1) “actual notice” of the extraneous information and
(2) “relied upon th[e] documents in framing the complaint. [M]ere notice or possession is not enough” for
a court to treat an extraneous document as integral to a
complaint; the complaint must “rel[y] heavily upon
[the document’s] terms and effect” for that document
to be integral.41
DeLuca did not actually lay out a test to determine “reliance”—
rather, it stated conditions which, if present, would allow a court to
conclude the document was relied upon for purposes of determining
whether that document could be properly considered on a dismissal
motion.
In lieu of a determination of whether a plaintiff “relied” on
extrinsic evidence, several courts have held dismissal may not be
avoided when a complaint strategically avoids reference to a document for the purpose of avoiding dismissal.42 In In re Lyondell
39
See, e.g., Great British Teddy Bear Co. v. McNeil-PPC, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 3926, 2013
WL 1286148, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2013) (Where it was “evident” that plaintiff “relied upon . . . [emails] in framing the complaint,” the court could consider them, citing Cortec, but not explaining what made it “evident.”).
40
695 F. Supp. 2d 54 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
41
DeLuca, 695 F. Supp. 2d at 60 (quoting Chambers, 282 F.3d at 153) (emphasis added).
42
See, e.g., Jacquemyns v. Spartan Mullen Et Cie, S.A.,No. 10 Civ. 1586, 2011 WL
348452, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2011) (“Plaintiffs’ failure to include matters of which as
pleaders they had notice and which were integral to their claim—and that they apparently
most wanted to avoid—may not serve as a means of forestalling the district court’s decision
on the motion.”); Cortec, 949 F.2d at 44; see also I. Meyer Pincus, 936 F.2d at 762 (“plaintiff [cannot] evade a properly argued motion to dismiss simply because plaintiff has chosen
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Chemical Co.,43 the court, synthesizing Second Circuit authorities,44
noted an apparent conflict between Cortec and Chambers, but held
Cortec remained controlling law:
[T]his Court does not understand the Chambers court
to have overruled the Cortec court’s statement that
“[p]laintiffs’ failure to include matters of which as
pleaders they had notice and which were integral to
their claim—and that they apparently most wanted to
avoid—may not serve as a means of forestalling the
district court’s decision on the motion.” The [Lyondell] Court synthesizes the arguably clashing rulings
in Chambers, on the one hand, and Cortec, Brass, and
International Audiotext, on the other, to lay out a principle that as a general matter, extrinsic matter should
not be considered on a motion to dismiss . . . . But if
the plaintiff . . . knows about it and intentionally
chooses to disregard it, a moving defendant still may
rely on that extrinsic matter in moving to dismiss, and
the Court need not subject that defendant, and the
Court system, to the additional expense and burden of
considering that same matter later on a motion for
summary judgment.45
When the language of a complaint is contradicted by the language of an agreement that plaintiff attempts to hide from a court,
and the court discovers the agreement and concludes plaintiff tried to
create a false impression as to the material facts by secreting a document which would “give the lie” to a specious factual presentation,
such documents are properly considered by the court.46
not to attach the [document] to the complaint or to incorporate it by reference”).
43
491 B.R. 41 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 505 B.R. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
44
Lyondell, 491 B.R. at 50 n.48 (explaining that, in its view, the Second Circuit, in
Chambers, had “cut back” on the liberal pleading rule set forth in the 1990s as to what documents could be properly considered on a motion to dismiss. “In its 2002 decision in Chambers, the Circuit cut back on earlier, broader, pronouncements in Cortec, Brass, and International Audiotext in the 1990s in which the Circuit had stated, in substance, that trial courts
could consider, on motions to dismiss, documents that plaintiffs had in their possession or
knew about that would defeat their claims.”).
45
Id. (quoting Cortec, 949 F.2d at 44) (emphasis added).
46
See, e.g., Karmilowicz v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., No. 11 Civ. 539, 2011 WL
2936013, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2011) (explaining that where complaint failed to attach
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This was the case, for example, in Ginx, Inc. v. Soho Alliance,47 where the court held:
As will be seen, any reference to several important
court and administrative documents has been inexplicably and improperly omitted from the Amended
Complaint, thereby creating a demonstrably false impression of certain key facts . . . . When plaintiffs fail
to include any reference to documents that they knew
of that are integral to their claim, there is no need for
the court to convert the motion to a summary judgment motion in order to take them into account.
“[P]laintiffs’ failure to include matters of which as
pleaders they had notice and which were integral to
their claim—and that they apparently most wanted to
avoid—may not serve as a means of forestalling the
district court’s decision on the motion.” . . . [T]he rule
just discussed means the Court can consider the text of
the April 17, 2007 Reasons for Approval; the second
Article 78 petition; and Justice Shafer’s decision on
that petition—all critically important documents that
Plaintiffs’ counsel has elected not to refer to in the
complaint (I assume because they give the lie to several key allegations of “fact” in the amended pleading).48
certain plans to pleading and none of the specific plan provisions were referenced in complaint allegations, and defendant submitted copies of the documents to the court on motion to
dismiss, plans could properly be considered). On appeal, the Second Circuit explained that a
plaintiff cannot “evade a properly argued motion to dismiss simply because [the] plaintiff
has chosen not to attach [a document on which he relies in bringing suit] to the complaint or
to incorporate it by reference.” Karmilowicz v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 494 F.App’x
153, 156 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting I. Meyer Pincus, 936 F.2d at 762; Cortec, 949 F.2d at 44).
“Plaintiffs’ failure to include matters of which as pleaders they had notice and which were
integral to their claim—and that they apparently most wanted to avoid—may not serve as a
means of forestalling the district court's decision on the motion.” Id. The court in
Karmilowicz affirmed because plaintiff’s claims were “defeated by the plain language of the
compensation plans upon which they purport to rely. Though Karmilowicz did not attach
these plans (or letters summarizing them) to his Complaint, The Hartford provided them to
the court in support of its motion to dismiss, and the court properly consulted them.” Id. at
156.
47
720 F. Supp. 2d 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
48
Id. at 345, 352 (quoting Cortec, 949 F.2d at 44; see I. Meyer Pincus, 936 F.2d at 762
(refusing “to create a rule permitting a plaintiff to evade a properly argued motion to dismiss
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Federal courts outside the Second Circuit have taken a similar position.
In Parrino v. FHP, Inc.,49 for example, the Ninth Circuit explained that the rules governing when a court may consider extrinsic
documents should reflect the policy that plaintiffs should not be permitted to deliberately omit references to documents when three conditions are met: authenticity is not in issue, plaintiff is on notice of
document contents, and plaintiff’s claim depends on the document.50
Citing Parrino, a California district court, in Martinez v. Welk Group,
Inc.,51 noted that plaintiff’s claims rested on the contents and terms of
an agreement which the complaint referenced, regarding a property
interest.52 Plaintiff failed to attach the agreement but the defense
provided a report, referenced in the agreement, to support its contention that plaintiff had not acquired the property interest at issue.53
Because plaintiff’s claim rested on the agreement’s contents and
terms which the report helped define, the court held that the report
was “essential” (read “integral”) to the claim and could be properly
considered.54
In McNulty v. Reddy Ice Holdings, Inc.,55 a Michigan federal
case, plaintiff failed to fully explain the contents of an agreement in a
complaint which, the court concluded, had the effect of rendering the
complaint “misleading.”56 By “revealing only those portions that
help his case, while hiding those which clearly are relevant and applicable, Plaintiff has put the Release in play.”57
In each of the above non-New York federal cases, the courts
determined they were not required to accept a plaintiff’s misleading
factual presentation created or bolstered by a tactical or strategic
omission of documents that would, if presented to the court, put the
lie to plaintiff’s representation of the factual basis of the subject
simply because plaintiff has chosen not to attach the [document] to the complaint or to incorporate it by reference”)).
49
146 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 1998).
50
Id. at 705-06.
51
No. 09 CV. 2883, 2011 WL 90313, at *1, *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2011).
52
Id. at *3.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
No. 08 CV. 13178, 2009 WL 1508381, at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 29, 2009), rev’d on other
grounds, 2009 WL 2168231 (E.D. Mich. July 17, 2009).
56
Id. at 6.
57
Id.
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claims.
Other courts, however, have declined efforts to incorporate by
reference extrinsic documents which have only implicitly been referenced in a complaint,58 particularly when only limited reference to
such documents is made,59 and/or courts conclude plaintiff has not
“heavily relied” on the proffered documents’ “terms and effect” in
order to “frame” complaint allegations.60
When it is patent, however, that the pleader avoided mentioning a document precisely to manipulate and pre-determine the outcome of anticipated dismissal motion practice by creating a false factual presentation, while imposing costs on defendant and wasting
judicial resources, they have encountered substantial judicial hostility.
In Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art,61 for example, the son
and daughter-in-law of a deceased anti-Nazi artist sued an art museum seeking a declaration of title and replevin of three of the artist’s
paintings.62 The question was when the statute of limitations began
to run on plaintiffs’ claims or, restated, when did the museum actually reject plaintiffs’ request for replevin, which would be the moment
of accrual of the limitation period.63 The court rejected plaintiffs’ accrual argument and plaintiffs sought re-consideration and reargument.64 Plaintiffs acknowledged intervening communication between the parties but did not attach copies to the complaint.65 The
museum moved to dismiss arguing the correspondence was “integral”
to the complaint and provided same to the court to support its motion.66 The court began by observing that “[p]laintiffs were required
to plead compliance with the statute of limitations . . . which necessarily rendered the parties’ correspondence ‘integral’ to the com-

58

See Madu, Edozie & Madu, 265 F.R.D. at 124.
See, e.g., Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1066 (2d Cir. 1985); Global Network
Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 458 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 2006).
60
See, e.g., DeLuca, 695 F. Supp. 2d at 59-60 (concluding that documents that were not
integral to the complaint would not be considered when defense had not shown plaintiff
heavily relied on terms of such documents).
61
772 F. Supp. 2d 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
62
Id. at 476, 490.
63
Id. at 481-83.
64
Id. at 491.
65
Grosz, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 491.
66
Id. at 496-97.
59
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plaint,”67 and, thus “obviated any need to convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.”68
Explaining that matters outside the pleading may be properly
considered in “adjudicating a motion to dismiss if they are ‘integral’
to a plaintiff’s claims, even [when] the plaintiff fails to append or allude to them in [a] complaint,”69 the Court held that plaintiffs could
not properly avoid matters “integral” to their claims to forestall dismissal under Rule 12.70 Otherwise, the court explained, the pleader
could “evade a properly argued motion to dismiss simply because
plaintiff has chosen not to attach the [document] to the complaint or
to incorporate it by reference.”71 The court then explained the sense
in which plaintiffs could “rely” on documents not attached to the
complaint (or referenced in it), and what it means to be “integral”:
Plaintiffs clearly relied on the entire course of correspondence between the parties when they framed their
Complaint. By affirmatively pleading that the April
12, 2006 letter was MoMA’s “refusal” of their demand, Plaintiffs necessarily represented that those earlier letters did not convey any “refusal.” This made
the correspondence between the parties “integral” to
Plaintiffs’ claim of conversion, specifically to the contention in their Complaint that they had complied with
the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs could not evade
MoMA’s statute of limitations argument by ignoring
the earlier letter that was unfavorable to their point of
view—including especially the July 20, 2005 letter
from Lowry to Jentsch that MoMA (and eventually the
Court) identified as the Museum’s actual refusal of
Plaintiffs’ demand for purposes of the demand-andrefusal rule.72

67

Id.
Id. at 497.
69
Id.
70
Grosz, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
71
Id. (quoting I. Meyer Pincus, 936 F.2d at 762).
72
Grosz, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 497 (emphasis added). The court noted that the letter at issue
had also been brought to the Court's attention in another way when plaintiffs chose to call
the court's attention to a different letter, as support for their argument that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled. The letter which referred to earlier correspondence be68
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Because plaintiffs relied on a theory of conversion for which the
date of the refusal of plaintiffs’ demand would trigger the limitation
period, plaintiffs, by characterizing one piece of correspondence
within the course of correspondence as the “actual refusal,” made the
entire course, not just the individual piece of correspondence that
plaintiffs asserted was the accrual trigger, “integral” to plaintiffs’ liability theory.73 Stated otherwise, the “terms and effect” of the documents making up the course of correspondence would be determinative of the “actual refusal” date. Plaintiffs would not be permitted to
cherry-pick favorable pieces of correspondence while hiding unfavorable ones because it was the “course of correspondence”—not individual pieces of correspondence—that would determine the plausibility of plaintiffs’ accrual date analysis—a matter the court
concluded was “integral” to the complaint’s allegations. In fact, the
sustainability of the pleading would be determined by that “course.”74
IV.

COURTS SHOULD EMPLOY A “BUT FOR” ANALYSIS TO
DETERMINE RELIANCE ON EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
A.

The Traditional Test of “Reliance”

In List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,75 the Second Circuit set forth
what has become the traditional meaning and test of “reliance,” in a
securities fraud case, based on a strategic omission.76 The court extween the parties, led the court “inexorably back to the letter that proved fatal to Plaintiffs'
lawsuit.” Id. at 497 n.3; see also L-7 Designs, Inc., 647 F.3d at 422 (stating emails were “integral” to the negotiation exchange that plaintiff identified as the basis for its Complaint).
73
Grosz, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
74
Id.
75
340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
76
Id.; see generally Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 506 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1974). The concept of reliance finds its classic formulation in List v. Fashion Park . . . . “The test of ‘reliance’ is whether ‘the misrepresentation is
a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct which results in the recipient’s
loss.’ ” Id. (quoting List, 340 F.2d at 462). The court went on to note that “[t]he reason for
this requirement . . . is to certify that the conduct of the defendant actually caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Id.; see generally Merritt B. Fox, Securities Class Actions Against Foreign
Issuers, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1188-89 (2012):
The seminal case defining traditional reliance is the Second Circuit’s
1965 opinion in List v. Fashion Park, Inc. The district court in List
found that the plaintiff, with regard to one of his allegations, would have
sold his stock even if he had known the true situation. The district court
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plained and held:
[W]e do not agree with certain overtones in the opinion of the trial court concerning the meaning of ‘reliance’ in a case of non-disclosure under Rule 10b-5.
The opinion intimates that the plaintiff must prove he
actively relied on the silence of the defendant, either
because he consciously had in mind the negative of
the fact concealed, or perhaps because he deliberately
put his trust in the advice of the defendant. Such a requirement, however, would unduly dilute the obligation of insiders to inform outsiders of all material
facts, regardless of the sophistication or naiveté of the
persons with whom they are dealing. . . . The proper
test is whether the plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently than he did act if the defendant
had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact. . . . This
test preserves the common law parallel between ‘reliance’ and ‘materiality,’ differing as it does from the
definition of ‘materiality’ under Rule 10b-5 solely by
substituting the individual plaintiff for the reasonable
man. Of course this test is not utterly dissimilar from
the one hinted at by the trial court. That the outsider
did not have in mind the negative of the fact undisclosed to him, or that he did not put his trust in the advice of the insider, would tend to prove that he would
not have been influenced by the undisclosed fact even
if the insider had disclosed it to him.77
Restated, the reliance element is satisfied if the pleading plaintiff
filed would have been materially different, but for his or her review
of the document in issue.78 Reciprocally, reliance will not be satisdismissed the claim relating to this allegation and the Second Circuit affirmed. Citing common law authorities, the court found that “the test of
reliance” is whether “the misrepresentation is a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct which results in [the recipient’s] loss.”
The court stated, “The reason for this requirement . . . is to certify that
the conduct of the defendant actually caused the plaintiff’s injury.”
Id. (quoting List, 340 F.2d at 462).
77
List, 340 F.2d at 463-64; see generally Fox, supra note 77, at 1188-89.
78
Fox, supra note 77, at 1190; see generally Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
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fied when it cannot be determined that plaintiff would have acted differently than he actually did.79
B.
Reliance in Securities Fraud and RICO Cases—
Basic Inc., Halliburton II and Bridge
Securities fraud and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”) cases80 often provide thorough analyses
of the reliance concept. The question of how reliance is construed is
of import in litigation generally, but especially securities litigation
where cases, by their nature, often turn on the content of documents.
The reliance concept has been front and center in several recent Supreme Court cases. In securities class suits relying on the fraud on
the market theory, for example, reliance, since the seminal case of
Basic Inc. v. Levinson,81 has been presumed under a so-called “rebuttable presumption of reliance.”82 The Court’s recent decision in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.,83 re-examining Basic, affirmed the presumption of reliance by a plaintiff class.84 In doing so,
Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (applying the List test of reliance—
whether plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently than he did act if defendant
had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact); Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp.
1333, 1341-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (“Reliance and causation are often used interchangeably,” in
applying List test of reliance and holding: “the question is whether the plaintiffs or any of
them would have been influenced to act differently than they did if they had known the material information at the time of sale, and if they would, whether they were damaged by defendants’ conduct.”); see generally Fox, supra note 77, at 1188-89 (“The seminal case defining traditional reliance is the Second Circuit’s 1965 opinion in List . . . . [T]he test of
reliance” is whether “the misrepresentation is a substantial factor in determining the course
of conduct which results in [the recipient’s] loss.” The court stated, “The reason for this requirement . . . is to certify that the conduct of the defendant actually caused the plaintiff’s
injury.”); but see Fin. Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. C-1257, 1971 WL
3973, at *4 (D.Colo. Jan. 28, 1971), rev’d, 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973) (stating List reliance test was actually talking about the causal factor rather than the reliance factor which
traditionally existed in the common law action of fraud and deceit, noting Rule 10b-5 does
not specify or define any particular type of reliance).
79
See, e.g., Bell v. Cameron Meadows Land Co., 669 F.2d 1278, 1283 (9th Cir. 1982) (“A
finding of nonreliance implies that plaintiffs would have acted no differently had they known
the truth.”).
80
18 U.S.C. § 1961 et. seq.
81
485 U.S. 224 (1988).
82
Id. at 248-49 nn.28-29.
83
134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
84
Id. at 2408-09. See generally Laurence A. Steckman, Robert E. Conner and Stuart S.
Rosenthal, Reliance and Loss Causation in Securities Fraud Class Certification Motion
Practice After Halliburton II, PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT REPORTER, Vol.
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it rejected the argument made by the defendant and some of its amici
that direct reliance, as in common law fraud cases, should be required.85
In analyzing a RICO claim,86 the Court, in Bridge v. Phoenix
Bond & Indemnity Co.,87 recently resolved a Federal Circuit split as
to whether plaintiff must allege first party reliance on a mail or wire
communication to state a RICO claim or whether a third-party’s reliance could be deemed, in some situations, to satisfy the reliance element for purposes of the claim.88 The Court held that if plaintiff can
show proximate (loss) causation between his or her injury and a mail
or wire communication by defendant, even if that communication
were made by defendant to a third party, sufficient “reliance” exists
for RICO statutory purposes to impose liability on defendant.89
In other words, first party, direct reliance, is not mandated by
RICO; rather, third party reliance is all the “reliance” plaintiff needs
to plead when a RICO case is based on mail or wire fraud.90 Liability
may be imposed when the statutory purpose of the legislation would
be compromised by a wooden requirement of direct, face-to-face reliance, as understood in common law terms.91 These cases illustrate
the flexibility of the reliance concept, as interpreted by the Court, in
securities and RICO contexts.
37, Nos. 3 & 4 at 35, (June-July, 2014) (symposium on the effect of Halliburton II in Securities Litigation).
85
Id.
86
18 U.S.C. § 1961 et. seq.
87
553 U.S. 639 (2008) (describing competing positions).
88
Id. at 646 (“[T]hree other circuits that have considered this question agree . . . that the
direct victim may recover through RICO whether or not it is the direct recipient of the false
statements.” See, e.g., Mid Atlantic Telecom, Inc. v. Long Distance Servs., Inc., 18 F.3d 260
(4th Cir. 1994); Systems Management, Inc. v. Loiselle, 303 F.3d 100 (1st Cir. 2002); Ideal
Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 373 F.3d 251 (2nd Cir. 2004). However, two Circuits hold that
the plaintiff must show that it in fact relied on the defendant’s misrepresentations. See, e.g.,
Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co. v. Bridge, 477 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2007); Sikes v. Teleline, Inc.,
281 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2002). Compare Sandwich Chef of Texas, Inc. v. Reliance Nat.
Indemnity Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 205, 223 (5th Cir. 2003) (recognizing “a narrow exception to
the requirement that the plaintiff prove direct reliance on the defendant’s fraudulent predicate act . . . when the plaintiff can demonstrate injury as a direct and contemporaneous result
of [a] fraud committed against a third party”), with Appletree Square I, L.P. v. W.R. Grace &
Co., 29 F.3d 1283, 1286–87 (8th Cir. 1994) (requiring the plaintiff to show that it detrimentally relied on the defendant's misrepresentations).
89
See Bridge, 553 U.S. at 657.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 652.
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CONCLUSION

The traditional test for reliance can and should be used to determine whether extrinsic evidence is “integral” for motion to dismiss
purposes. Doing so, however, does not require any alternation of the
traditional concept of reliance set forth in List: “[t]he proper test is
whether the plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently
than he did act if the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed
fact.”92 If the filed pleading would have been materially different but
for plaintiff’s knowledge of the contents of a document in its possession, sufficient reliance exists for courts to consider such a document
on a dismissal motion, without converting that motion to one for
summary judgment.
This should be true even if the document was neither attached
to a pleading nor mentioned in it, and the document’s actual terms
and conditions are not overtly presented to the reviewing court. This
rule protects plaintiffs when documents omitted from a pleading are
non-material, and protects defendants and the courts from pre-filing
manipulation by those who would file claims based on specious factual presentations, hoping Rule 12 pleading limitation rules will let
them slip past dismissal. A “but for” analysis of reliance provides
courts with a straight-forward means of determining whether extrinsic evidence should be considered on a rule 12 motion, even in cases
where neither documents nor the information in them is expressly cited in a pleading.

92

List, 340 F.2d at 463-64.
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